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INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE two scenarios. In the first, you live in a quiet residentialcommunity with easy access to your city’s center. Your next-doorneighbor, whom you have known for years, regularly rents out his
home to one or two tourists who respect the peaceful character of the
neighborhood. In the second scenario, you lease a unit in an urban apart-
ment building, and the unit next to you, whose owner you have never
met, always has strangers coming and going who leave trash in the com-
mon areas and throw all-night parties. Your friends experience the same
kinds of problems in their buildings, and your rent has steadily been ris-
ing over the past few years. In either scenario, your neighbor’s conduct
might be considered illegal under the same short-term rental ordinance in
your city simply because, in both scenarios, the property owner is con-
ducting short-term rentals (STRs) for fewer than thirty days.
Cities throughout the country are battling the nuisances that sometimes
accompany residential STRs in a number of ways. With the rise of in-
ternet-based home-sharing platforms, such as Airbnb.com, property own-
ers of all shapes and sizes have taken to the web to rent out their spare
rooms or their whole homes to vacationers visiting their communities in
order to make a little cash on the side, to keep up with the cost of living
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in some of the nation’s most expensive cities, or as a primary means of
deriving income.1 The response of many cities, while attempting to ad-
dress the valid concerns of their citizens, has challenged the limits of the
Constitution. At what point must the state, through its municipal bodies,
step in to regulate the transactions occurring between homeowners and
short-term lodgers? At what point is the state’s regulation an interference
with the rights of property owners? This Comment will seek to answer
these questions by looking at cases from throughout the country, with a
focus on the current legal battle between the City of Austin and STR
advocates there.
As this Comment will show, cities have extensive authority to regulate
STRs under their traditional zoning powers with a view to effective city
planning, but such ordinances must avoid rising to the level of a regula-
tory taking or asserting flawed policy justifications. Cities can avoid the
regulatory taking issue by recognizing pre-existing property rights. But
STR ordinances may also be attacked if they are guided by hollow or
misleading policies that do not promote the general welfare and do not
clearly address the kind of behavior they seek to curtail. Part I of this
Comment proposes three categories of STR use and gives a summary of
how various cities in the United States have attempted to regulate the
current STR phenomenon. Part II establishes how modern STR regula-
tions may rise to the level of a regulatory taking requiring just compensa-
tion under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by
assessing the impact of a leading Texas appellate case deciding an STR
dispute.2 In Part III, this Comment shows how STR laws describe the
extent to which cities are allowed to define (1) the term “family,” (2)
occupancy caps, and (3) categories of use. Part IV analyzes the merits of
various police power justifications cities have used to validate STR
regulation.
I. SHORT-TERM RENTALS ON SHARING PLATFORMS
PRESENT A NEW TYPE OF REGULATORY
CHALLENGE
Americans have a long history of using their extra space for rental in-
come. This Part will first offer some historical background on zoning reg-
ulation and then establish three models of behavior for better framing the
future STR legal landscape. Finally, this Part will give a basic overview of
zoning law, highlight some of the responses various cities across the na-
tion have undertaken, and show a spectrum of regulation from the more
hands-off to the very strict.
1. See U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE “SHARING” ECONOMY ISSUES FACING PLAT-
FORMS, PARTICIPANTS & REGULATORS (2016), 2016 WL 6848922, at *15 [hereinafter FTC
Report].
2. See Jamilla Jefferson-Jones, Airbnb and the Housing Segment of the Modern “Shar-
ing Economy”: Are Short-Term Rental Restrictions an Unconstitutional Taking?, 42 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 557 (2015).
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A. HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF LODGING AND THE RISE OF
THE SHARING ECONOMY
Widespread use of one’s primary residence as a boarding house to sup-
plement one’s income may predate even our Republic.3 Since the begin-
ning of zoning ordinances near the turn of the twentieth century,
however, cities have attempted to segregate areas of their territory by
classifications of land use, whether residential, commercial, or industrial.4
Regulation of short-term lodgings is certainly nothing new, as cities have
long categorized such uses as boarding houses, lodging houses, bed and
breakfasts, hotels, motels, and hostels.5 While society generally respects
the authority of cities to ensure that a large hotel with hundreds of rooms
is not placed in the middle of a large, single-family residential area, a
neighbor might simply not care that the house next door is rented out to a
tourist for the weekend.
Never before have property owners been able to connect so easily with
potential short-term lodgers through internet platforms scholars call the
“sharing economy.”6 The sharing economy refers to the increasing num-
ber of peer-to-peer transactions being performed for services such as car
transportation and, as pertinent here, home-sharing.7 Cities face a new
challenge in how they must meet the needs of their communities because
not all property owners have welcomed the presence of short-term lodg-
ers in their residential neighborhoods.8
At the center of the current debate is the popular internet-based home-
sharing platform, Airbnb. The company sponsors a mobile phone applica-
tion and website that allows anybody with a phone and a spare bedroom
to post a listing to allow another user to reserve a night’s stay or longer.9
In less than a decade, CEO Brian Chesky and his co-founders took the
tech company from a start-up to a global behemoth worth more than
thirty billion dollars that serves over 150 million guests located in almost
3. Id. at 562–63.
4. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ZONING AND A CURE FOR
ITS EXCLUSIONARY EFFECTS 3–4 (2001), https://www.dartmouth.edu/~wfischel/Papers/02-
03.pdf [ https://perma.cc/7GGY-SHQW].
5. See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 25-2-3 to -4 (2012), https://www
.municode.com/library/tx/austin/codes/code_of_ordinances [https://perma.cc/JW8J-Y8EG]
(Note that the city code in Austin classifies bed and breakfasts under residential use
whereas hotel-motels are classified as commercial use.).
6. Jefferson-Jones, supra note 2, at 557.
7. Id. at 557–58.
8. See Roy Samaan, Airbnb, Rising Rent, and The Housing Crisis in Los Angeles 17,
LOS ANGELES ALLIANCE FOR A NEW ECONOMY [LAANE] 2015 (Mar. 2015), http://www
.laane.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/AirBnB-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4VT-PM7X].
But see Roberta A. Kaplan & Michael L. Nadler, Airbnb: A Case Study in Occupancy
Regulation and Taxation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 103, 107 (2015) (“only” thirty-six
percent of residents oppose Airbnb in New York City).
9. About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [https://perma.cc/
UWX4-95H5].
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200 countries.10 Airbnb is not alone in its business model, as other home
sharing companies such as Homeaway.com, Vrbo.com, and Vaca-
tionhomerentals.com also allow property owners to easily connect with
those seeking STRs through their databases of online listings.
B. HELPFUL TERMINOLOGY AND THREE BASIC MODELS
OF STR USE11
Generally speaking, there are three parties to internet STR transac-
tions: the host, the guest, and the platform. “Host” means the party listing
the property as an available STR. The host could be either the owner of
the property or a leaseholder, although a lease between an owner and a
tenant may restrict the ability of the lessee to use the property for
STRs.12 The “guest” is simply the person, whether a business traveler or
tourist, who books the STR accommodation. The “platform” is the in-
ternet service that connects host with guest. Platforms, such as Airbnb,
may receive a portion of the rental income from the host for the privilege
of using their services.13
The way cities have responded to the regulatory challenges presented
by this phenomenon is best understood by setting out three basic models
of how homeowners (or long-term leaseholders) have generally used
their property for STRs. While there are countless permutations of the
models this Comment proposes, STRs can essentially be characterized by
(1) home sharing, (2) home rental, or (3) transient rental.
In the “home sharing” model, the guest and the host are co-occupants
of the premises during the guest’s stay. Home sharing maximizes the ac-
countability of the host because if the guest causes any nuisance to sur-
rounding neighbors, the host is right there to deal with the problem.
Austin refers to this type of arrangement as a Type I STR.14
The second model is “home rental” where the host uses her primary
residence for the STR, but instead of restricting the guest to one room or
STR unit, the guest has rented the entire dwelling, and the host does not
10. Id.; Matt Rosoff, Airbnb Is Now Worth $30 Billion, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 6,
2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/airbnb-raises-850-million-at-30-billion-valuation-
2016-8 [https://perma.cc/KWD5-8XKY].
11. The three models proposed infra are similar to those proposed by the City of Santa
Monica in its 2015 report on STRs, with slight variations in that a new category is added
and the name “vacation rental” is changed to “transient rental.” See CITY OF SANTA
MONICA, CITY COUNCIL REPORT 9 (April 28, 2015), https://www.smgov.net/departments/
council/agendas/2015/20150428/s2015042807-A.pdf [https://perma.cc/543X-36SR].
12. Maggie Kerkman & Deanna Dewberry, Listing Apartment Gets Tenant in Trouble,
NBC DFW (Jan. 28, 2016) (citing Professor Mary Spector’s assertion that landlords may
evict tenants conducting STRs without landlord permission), http://www.nbcdfw.com/news/
local/Apartment-Leasers-Beware-Listing-on-Airbnb-366819821.html [https://perma.cc/
N749-APMG].
13. Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 3:16–cv–03615–JD, 2016 WL 6599821, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016).
14. See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-788 (2015), https://www
.municode.com/library/tx/austin/codes/code_of_ordinances [https://perma.cc/SQY3-7H3F].
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occupy the home during the guest’s stay.15 A host under the home rental
model is less accountable than under the home sharing model, but still
more accountable than under the last model—“transient rental.” Under
the Austin ordinance, both the home rental and transient rental models
would, in all fairness, fall under the Type II classification, with Type III
being an STR of a multi-family dwelling such as a duplex or apartment.16
Under a transient rental model, the host is essentially operating an in-
come property that does not serve as the host’s primary residence but is
for the sole purpose of STRs. Hosts utilizing the transient rental model
are the least accountable of the three models.
Conceptualizing the issue under these three general models is impor-
tant because the behavior of STR hosts and guests can vary widely, from
heavy interference with neighboring property owners to having abso-
lutely no impact.17 Consequently, some activity may warrant modest reg-
ulation, whereas in other cases, no regulation would be warranted at all.
The thesis of this Comment states supra that STR ordinances can be at-
tacked for not being rationally related to the general welfare. The more
the ordinance takes into account these differences in use and the varying
degree to which they affect neighboring property, the better the city’s
argument will be that it drafted the laws in consideration of the needs of
the community rather than arbitrarily. The Type I-III categories used in
the Austin ordinance are a good start, but the ordinance still does not
consider the primary residence (home renting) versus separately owned
income property (transient rental) distinction.18
C. CITIES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNET-
BASED HOME SHARING IN DIFFERENT WAYS
Zoning power is a fundamental authority used by modern cities to
structure their development and is considered a legitimate exercise of the
state’s police power unless the zoning ordinance is arbitrary or unreason-
able and without a “substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.”19 The power to zone is the power to divide
up the locality’s geographic area into different categories of land use that
are inconsistent with each other.20 Thus, the residential is separated from
commercial and industrial areas, and ordinances generally provide for
sub-categories and statutory definitions therein.21 Residential districts are
usually further separated into single-family and multi-family.22 Scholars
sometimes characterize the uses as the Euclidean zoning pyramid, with
the most restrictive single-family residential category at the top and the
15. See id.; City Council Report, supra note 11.
16. See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 25-2-788 to -789.
17. See Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 535 (2016).
18. See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 25-2-788 to -790.
19. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
20. 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 98 (2016).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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least restrictive manufacturing and industrial uses at the bottom.23
The courts have long upheld the distinction between single-family resi-
dential and multi-family use because “[t]he police power is not confined
to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out
zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclu-
sion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”24 Because STRs
do not easily meet either a residential or commercial definition,25 cities
have taken a variety of approaches in recent years in attempting to curb
their impact. The illustrations that follow are only a small sampling of
cities that have begun to regulate STRs.26
1. New York City, New York
Perhaps the greatest challenge for city zoning officials is presented by
the STR situation in New York City, where the city’s 8,550,405 citizens
live with a 27,000 per square mile population density.27 The New York
State Assembly amended its Multiple Dwelling Law (MDL—the statute
that regulates building codes throughout the state and sets occupancy lim-
its) in 2010 to define “permanent occupancy” as anything over thirty
days, thus apartment buildings designated as “Class A” can only be
rented out on a month or longer basis with anything less than that being a
technically illegal rental.28
New York likely felt the Airbnb boom after 2008 the hardest, leading
to the passage of its strict MDL amendment.29 In its report on the Airbnb
impact in New York City, the Attorney General’s office cites mostly fire
and safety concerns for apartment buildings that are different from ho-
tels, and not required to meet the same code standards,30 but the state
was also motivated by a desire to preserve affordable housing.31 After the
amendment was passed, the Attorney General brought a subpoena
against Airbnb to provide host information in anticipation of an enforce-
ment action in 2014, but the New York Supreme Court in Albany
23. See, e.g., Laurie C. Malkin, Troubles at the Doorstep: The Fair Housing Amend-
ments Act of 1988 and Group Homes for Recovering Substance Abusers, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 757, 802 (1995).
24. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
25. See Zale, supra note 17, at 523 (“while the commercial/noncommercial duality is
recognized in a wide range of contexts, determining where to draw the line between the
two is challenging”).
26. See generally LAUREN HIRSHON ET AL., NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITIES, THE
SHARING ECONOMY AND WHAT’S NEXT (2015).
27. New York City Population, NYC PLANNING, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/
data-maps/nyc-population/population-facts.page [https://perma.cc/3TTH-GB67] (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2017).
28. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4(8) (West 2012).
29. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AIRBNB
IN THE CITY 2 (2014), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VDS4-CBX5].
30. Id. at 4.
31. See Katie Benner, Airbnb Sues over New Law Regulating New York Rentals, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/technology/new-york-passes-
law-airbnb.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/BEZ8-YMEE].
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quashed the subpoena as overbroad, in favor of Airbnb’s motion.32
Airbnb and New York officials will likely continue struggling to find com-
mon ground for the foreseeable future.
2. Santa Monica, California
The approach of officials in the Los Angeles area has generally been
comparable to those in New York because in Santa Monica the city has
decided to strictly prohibit whole-dwelling rentals in residential neighbor-
hoods.33 Santa Monica is a popular tourist destination for Los Angeles
visitors with its world class surfing beaches and famous amusement park
pier.34 “Vacation rental,” as Santa Monica defines the term, encompasses
both the home rental and transient rental models, and both activities are
equally prohibited by Chapter 6 of the Santa Monica Municipal Code.35
Home sharing, as defined under this Comment’s model and Santa
Monica’s definition, is, however, allowed with authorization from the city
in the form of a permit.36 Santa Monica states in its city council report on
STRs that illegal STRs have “established a strong presence in the City
and continue[ ] to flourish with little sign of abatement.”37 The city does
not have the resources that would be required to bring effective enforce-
ment actions against all 1,700 listings the city estimates are being illegally
marketed.38 Therefore, enforcement actions are brought on a complaint
basis.39
A man named Scott Shatford, who rented various properties in viola-
tion of the ordinance, was recently convicted in a plea deal with the city,
compelled to pay a $3,500 fine, and placed on two years’ probation.40 He
also agreed not to further list properties in violation of the ordinance.41
Shatford owned five properties that he listed in violation of the Santa
Monica ordinance and openly “boasted” about how he thought Santa
Monica would not be able to enforce its new law against him.42 Even
though Shatford knew the listings were illegal, he took the risk because,
in his words, “the money’s too good.”43 Mr. Shatford’s experience should
32. Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786, 793 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
33. See CITY OF SANTA MONICA, Overview of the Home-Sharing Ordinance, https://
www.smgov.net/Departments/PCD/Permits/Short-Term-Rental-Home-Share-Ordinance
[https://perma.cc/8APR-RP7R].
34. See generally CITY OF SANTA MONICA, https://www.smgov.net [https://perma.cc/
LA63-Y46X].
35. SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 6.20 (2015), http://www.qcode.us/
codes/santamonica (Perma link unavailable).
36. Id. ch. 6.20.020.
37. CITY OF SANTA MONICA, CITY COUNCIL REPORT 17 (April 28, 2015).
38. Id. at 17–18.
39. Id. at 17.
40. Hailey Branson-Potts, Santa Monica Convicts Its First Airbnb Host Under Tough
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serve as a warning for hosts who want to publicly take on their home
city’s STR regulation efforts. This story also shows how seriously some
cities are taking enforcement of their STR codes.
3. Denver, Colorado
Some cities have taken a more liberal approach in regulating STRs in
order to encourage the tourism industry and gain valuable tax revenue.44
Denver, while still requiring licenses at an annual rate of twenty-five dol-
lars, does not bar the home renting model.45 Denver’s ordinance requires
that transient occupancy taxes be paid and that proof of insurance be
given.46 The ordinance limits licensees to one primary residence and re-
quires documentary proof to establish the address as the host’s primary
residence.47 Denver recognizes the STR as an approved accessory use in
any residential district, even where the host is not present for the stay.48
Denver, along with some cities in other states,49 generally takes a more
favorable view of home sharing than the city has in New York or Santa
Monica.50
D. THE AUSTIN LAWSUIT—MAXIMIZING LAND USE PREROGATIVES
AND TESTING CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
One of the more recent STR litigation battles working its way through
the courts is the dispute between the City of Austin, Texas, and STR pro-
ponents there.51 For the past few decades Austin has hosted a massive
city-wide music, film, and technology festival in March called South By
Southwest (SXSW).52 Austin also plays host to the annual Austin City
Limits Music Festival, and many other events that are a nationwide tour-
44. Brendaliss Gonzalez, Short-Term Rentals One Step Closer to No Longer Being Ille-
gal in Denver, DENVER 7 (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.thedenverchannel.com/money/con
sumer/short-term-rentals-one-step-closer-to-no-longer-being-illegal-in-denver [https://per
ma.cc/PAM5-49WC].




47. Id. §§ 33–46.
48. See Denver Short-Term Rentals FAQ, Denvergov.org, https://www.denvergov.org/
content/dam/denvergov/Portals/723/documents/STR%20FAQ_2-29-16.pdf [https://perma
.cc/S5L2-C52Q]. Accessory uses are generally those that may be considered “‘incidental’
and ‘subordinate’ to the principal use.” Zale, supra note 17, at 550. Cities use the accessory
use concept to regulate uses such as the home office. Id.
49. See Dana Palombo, A Tale of Two Cities: The Regulatory Battle to Incorporate
Short-Term Residential Rentals into Modern Law, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 287, 296–97
(2015) (describing Airbnb’s “Shared City Initiative” and its partnership with Portland,
Oregon).
50. See Denver Short-Term Rentals FAQ, supra note 48; see also FTC Report, supra
note 1, at *63.
51. AG Paxton Joins Lawsuit Against City over Short-Term Rentals, KXAN (Oct. 5,
2016, 10:55 PM), http://kxan.com/2016/10/05/ag-paxton-joins-lawsuit-against-city-over-
short-term-rentals [https://perma.cc/QK8B-P3WL].
52. History, SOUTH BY SOUTHWEST, https://www.sxsw.com/about/history [https://per
ma.cc/M3PP-6YWJ].
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ist draw throughout the year.53 During these events, lodging in the city
tends to reach maximum capacity, and many of the visitors turn to STR
platforms to find places to stay.54
A group of hosts who profit from their STRs in Austin now seek to
challenge the new ordinance in Zaatari v. City of Austin.55 The Texas
Public Policy Foundation (TPPF), a property rights and free-enterprise
advocacy group, represents both hosts and guests in Austin in their suit
against the city.56 Plaintiffs claim that Austin’s STR ordinance is an illegal
interference with due process, assembly rights, freedom of movement,
and privacy rights under the Texas Constitution.57 Contrary to the ap-
proach authorities took in the New York battle, where the state and mu-
nicipal interests were aligned, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton
entered the lawsuit by filing a plea in intervention against Austin, claim-
ing that the regulations violate the constitutional rights of Texas citi-
zens.58 For its part, Austin entered a general denial to the claims of
plaintiffs.59
Austin originally enacted its ordinance under a permitting scheme that
gave different licenses for the different types of STRs that the host sought
to conduct in exchange for a licensing fee.60 The driving force behind
enacting stricter regulations to Austin’s STR market was a desire to
counter the nuisances attendant to what residents called “commercial
short-term rentals” operating right next to their single-family homes.61
Testimony at the City Council hearings described many instances of late-
night parties with throngs of people lasting through the night, along with
the accompanying noise, trash, trespassing, and even public urination by
STR guests.62
Because so many Austin residents were coming forward with these
cases, which STR advocates characterized as merely “bad actors,”63 the
city was eventually compelled to act. It made extensive amendments to its
53. AUSTIN CITY LIMITS MUSIC FESTIVAL, https://www.aclfestival.com; Arts and Lei-
sure, AUSTINTEXAS.GOV, http://austintexas.gov/resident/arts-and-leisure [https://perma.cc/
WF6A-EA2J].
54. See Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Im-
pact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, Abstract, Boston U. School of Management, Re-
search Paper No. 2013-16 (2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2366898 [https://perma.cc/
ZBY7-WPQT].
55. Original Petition, Application for Injunctive Relief, and Request for Disclosure at
2–8, Zaatari v. City of Austin, No. D-1-GN-16-002620 (53rd Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex.
2016) [hereinafter Orig. Pet.].
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1.
58. Plea in Intervention of Texas at 1, Zaatari v. City of Austin, No. D-1-GN-16-
002620 (53rd Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. Oct. 16, 2016).
59. Original Answer of Defendants at 1, Zaatari v. City of Austin, No. D-1-GN-16-
002620 (53rd Dist. Ct., Travis County, Tex. July 20, 2016).
60. See supra Part I.B.
61. See City of Austin, September 15, 2015 City Council Meetings, http://austintx.
swagit.com/play/09172015-549 [https://perma.cc/2ALW-EDCT] (click Item 78 (Part 1 of 4)
– Approve a recommendation regarding short-term rentals; then navigate to 21:10).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 19:30.
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STR ordinance in early 2016 to, among other things, place a six-unre-
lated-adult occupancy cap per dwelling and require a local point of con-
tact for out of town owners.64 But it also included many more invasive
provisions, such as § 25-2-795(E), which reads: “A licensee or guest may
not use or allow another to use a short-term rental for an outside assembly
of more than six adults between 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.”65 Furthermore,
“assembly” was defined in the statute to basically encompass any activity
“other than sleeping.”66 Hence, if an STR guest wanted to host a
barbeque at his rental, he would be capped at five friends or family mem-
bers, no matter the scale of the rental.67 When read along with subsection
(D) (“[a] . . . guest may not use or allow another to use a short-term rental
for an assembly between 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.”),68 there is a strong
case for what the TPPF has called, “a bedtime for tenants.”69 Thus, the
Austin ordinance is unique in that none of the other ordinances from
other cities discussed supra contain such extensive provisions seeking to
regulate personal conduct within their respective STR regulatory
frameworks.70 Austin no longer issues Type II permits, which encompass
both the home rental and transient rental models, and seeks to phase out
Type II rentals by 2022.71
The result of the Austin litigation will likely set a trend for how many
other cities will seek to regulate STRs going forward because it will show
how far a city could be allowed to go concerning this evolving area of the
law.72 Essentially, the lawsuit can be boiled down to two issues. The first
issue is whether the ordinance is an unconstitutional taking because it
deprives certain homeowners of all beneficial use of their land.73 This is
the claim brought by the Texas Attorney General and has the most rela-
tion to the zoning powers discussed infra.74 The second issue is whether
the ordinance exceeds the limits of the Due Process Clause and goes be-
yond being a pure zoning regulation by attempting to closely circum-
scribe certain categories of personal conduct.75 As to the first issue, this
Comment will argue that the municipality can regulate STRs under its
traditional zoning powers by setting occupancy caps and by preventing
commercial activity in residential zones.
64. AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-795(G), -796 (2015).
65. Id. § 25-2-795(E).
66. Id. § 25-2-795(F).
67. Orig. Pet., supra note 55, at 27.
68. AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-795(G).
69. Orig. Pet., supra note 55, at 2.
70. See supra Part I.C.
71. Mary Huber, Austin City Council Votes to Phase Out Some Short-Term Rentals,
AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN (Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.mystatesman.com/news/local/
austin-city-council-votes-phase-out-some-short-term-rentals/quWXfe-
caaVxgkP59DUXP3O [https://perma.cc/7Q5L-TTRJ].
72. See E-mail from Chance Weldon, Attorney, Texas Public Policy Foundation, to
author (Jan. 25, 2017, 10:55 CST) (on file with SMU Law Review Association).
73. See Plea in Intervention, supra note 58, at 4.
74. See infra Part II.
75. See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-795(G), -796.
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The plaintiffs in Zaatari raise important freedom of assembly and due
process questions in their pleadings about the extent to which the city
should be allowed to designate who and how many people a person has
over to a residence.76 The due process claim is partially addressed by Part
II’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas in Part II.B., infra,77 and by Part III’s policy justification analysis.
A more in-depth analysis of the plaintiff’s freedom of assembly claim is
warranted but is beyond the scope of this Comment.
II. STRIPPING STR RIGHTS COULD RISE TO THE LEVEL OF
A REGULATORY TAKING
An STR host who seeks to resist the impact of a new regulation may do
so by arguing that the state action is a type of interference with property
rights that is called a regulatory taking. This Part sets out the applicable
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence defining this legal principle, analyzes
an important Texas case that applies this standard to STR prohibitions by
the Village of Tiki Island, and assesses what the likely impact will be for
litigants in the Austin case. Furthermore, this Part discusses STR use
within the context of the legal doctrine of pre-existing use.
A. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT DEFINING REGULATORY TAKING
“Regulatory taking” is a term of art that should be distinguished from a
normal taking. The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, and similar state
constitutional provisions, usually involve applying eminent domain, which
is the legal principle allowing a public entity to seize private lands for a
public purpose if it pays the private owner “just compensation.”78 This
form of taking involves government physically entering, occupying, re-
forming, or destroying property.79 When a physical taking happens, mak-
ing a determination that government has taken the land and calculating
its value is relatively straightforward.80 However, the government may
also impose restrictions that, while not a “physical invasion” for public
use, interfere with the property owner’s rights in the land to such an ex-
tent that a regulatory taking occurs and justice demands that the property
owner be compensated.81
The Supreme Court further clarified that there are two distinct catego-
ries where there may be an instance of regulatory taking in Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council.82 The first is where government regulation causes the
property owner to suffer a physical incursion into the property, “no mat-
ter how minute,” and the second is where the property owner is denied
76. See Orig. Pet., supra note 55, at 1.
77. 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
78. See U.S. Const. amend V; see also Tex. Const. art. I, § 17(a).
79. Pa. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) [hereinafter
Penn Central].
80. See id.
81. Id. at 127–28.
82. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
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“all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”83 This second cat-
egory has been interpreted to mean that the owner suffers a total loss in
using the land, akin to a complete public seizure, and not a minor loss in
value.84 Finally, the Court reiterated the principle that if a regulation
does not have a substantial relation to a legitimate state interest, then the
regulation is a taking.85
But since Lucas, overturning a regulation of private property under the
rational relation test has been more appropriately cast as a Due Process
question rather than a Takings question by the Supreme Court in Lingle
v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.86 In her majority opinion, Justice O’Connor ex-
plained that:
Instead of addressing a challenged regulation’s effect on private
property, the “substantially advances” inquiry probes the regula-
tion’s underlying validity. But such an inquiry is logically prior to and
distinct from the question whether a regulation effects a taking, for
the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in
pursuit of a valid public purpose.87
However, using the “substantially advances” test in establishing a tak-
ing remains viable under Texas law because the Supreme Court of Texas
has not yet abrogated that standard in the wake of Lingle.88
Any municipal regulations seeking to curtail STR use in residential
zones do not involve a taking in the traditional sense because they do not
involve the government physically seizing a homeowner’s property for a
public purpose; thus, takings claims against STR ordinances will necessa-
rily be of the regulatory variety.89 Practically speaking, if a court deems
an STR ordinance to be a taking, the ordinance will probably be
amended and STR hosts will be allowed to continue with their activities
because the city could not realistically compensate them all adequately
given the proliferation of STR use.90
Pennsylvania Central Transportation Company v. City of New York is a
leading case helping to explain regulatory takings by acknowledging that
while there is no “set formula” to defining when government must com-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1017; see also Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660,
671 (Tex. 2004).
85. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016; see also Sheffield, 140 S.W.3d at 671.
86. 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005).
87. Id.
88. See Hackbelt 27 Partners, L.P. v. City of Coppell, 661 F. App’x 843, 849 (5th Cir.
2016) (applying Texas law).
89. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
90. For instance, the court in Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco observed that more
than 4,000 rentals were listed on Airbnb and operating illegally (not to mention other
home listing services). No. 3:16–cv–03615–JD, 2016 WL 6599821, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18,
2016). Assuming a court finds all those instances to be takings, and that the court must
compensate the owners at a rate of $25,000 a year (what claimants asserted in the case
analyzed in Part II.B., infra—a San Francisco landlord could probably make much more),
the city would end up paying $100,000,000 in compensation claims alone. Note that this
figure is also on the low end.
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pensate, there are still relevant factors to consider.91 These factors in-
clude: (1) the general economic impact upon the property owner, (2) the
extent to which a “distinct investment backed expectation” is frustrated,
and (3) the nature of the government interference.92 Not every slight in-
terference or economic impact upon a property owner by some action of
government will result in compensation because under such a regime
“[g]overnment could hardly go on.”93
In Penn Central, New York City passed a landmark preservation law
giving the Board of Estimate authority to designate historical landmarks
and impose building restrictions on those property owners.94 The Penn-
sylvania Central Transportation Company (Penn Central), as owner of
the Grand Central Station, sought to establish a regulatory takings claim
because its partner, UGP, a real estate company, was restricted from
building a multi-story office building on top of the terminal.95 Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, held that there could be no cognizable
claim for just compensation against the city.96 The Court reasoned that
the landmark law did not impact Penn Central’s ability to continue its
transportation operations as it had prior to the law’s passage and that
Penn Central and its partners conceded that a decrease in property value
alone cannot establish a taking.97
B. FOR EXISTING STR LICENSE HOLDERS IN TEXAS, BANNING STR
USE HAS AN ECONOMIC IMPACT ON THE PROPERTY OWNER
AND INTERFERES WITH INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS
In one of the few Texas cases to address the issue, the Texas Court of
Appeals, in Village of Tiki Island v. Ronquille, decided an STR dispute in
favor of the property owner, instead of the city as in Penn Central.98 The
court applied the Penn Central framework and decided that an STR pro-
hibition could plausibly constitute a regulatory taking under the Texas
Constitution.99 Plaintiffs in Tiki Island were condominium owners in a
resort community outside of Galveston on the Gulf Coast seeking injunc-
tive relief after the village passed an ordinance prohibiting their STR ac-
tivities.100 As many plaintiffs in STR cases have tended to do,101 the host-
property owners in Tiki Island brought a temporary injunction seeking to
91. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
92. Id.
93. See id. (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)).
94. Id. at 107–08.
95. Id. at 115–16.
96. Id. at 138.
97. Id. at 131, 136 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395
(1926)).
98. See 463 S.W.3d 562, 587–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
99. Id. at 585.
100. Id. at 564–65.
101. See Dexter 345 Inc. v. Cuomo, 663 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2011); City of New York v.
330 Continental LLC, 60 A.D.3d 226, 227 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009); Ewing v. City of Carmel-
By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 383–84 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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preclude the city from enforcing the new ordinance on them in anticipa-
tion of a trial and final judgment on the merits.102
Under the Texas standard for injunctive relief, the elements of a tem-
porary injunction are (1) a valid suit against the defendant, (2) a likeli-
hood of success on the merits, and (3) “a probable, imminent, and
irreparable injury” if equitable relief is denied.103 Preliminary injunctions
are crucial for STR hosts who depend on their rentals for income because
the injunctions help to “preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject
matter” leading up to a trial on the merits as well as keep the STR host
from having to suspend operations during the possible years of litigation
the case might endure.104 Equitable relief is also highly discretionary for
judges; therefore, advocates on both sides of the aisle should use policy
arguments bearing on these controversial STR zoning issues.105
With this procedural backdrop, the court examined the takings claim
under the familiar factors from Penn Central of what the economic im-
pact was upon the property owners, whether there was an interference
with “distinct investment-backed expectations,” and what the “character
of the government action” was.106 The factors are considered non-exhaus-
tive, and a totality of the circumstances analysis is required to determine
the appropriate balance of interests.107 Since this case arose on an inter-
locutory appeal, the issue was whether the evidence based on the plead-
ings could satisfy the standards for the trial court’s grant of the injunction
under abuse of discretion deference.108 Because the court found that the
trial court could issue the injunction within its discretion, the court up-
held the decision that plaintiffs adequately plead economic impact and
interference with investment-backed expectation so as to meet the re-
quirements of irreparable harm and probable success on the merits.109
The court determined that the plaintiffs had shown that there would be
a significant economic impact on their property values if unable to con-
tinue their STR use.110 The court based the finding on evidence of one
plaintiff’s stated income of $25,000 in 2014 and the live testimony of the
homeowners that they would be unable to generate such profits in the
future.111 These circumstances were distinguishable from a blocked real-
estate project for which the law does not necessarily recognize a right to
lost profits if government regulation frustrates such efforts because the
102. Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 583–84.
103. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); see also Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (including the Texas elements but adding as
elements (4) the balance of equities tips in plaintiff’s favor, and (5) issuance of equitable
relief is in the public’s interest).
104. See Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 584.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 575 (quoting Sheffield Dev. Co., Inc. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d
660, 672 (Tex. 2004)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 584.
109. See id. at 584, 587.
110. Id. at 579.
111. Id.
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government need not guarantee profitability for property owners subject
to its control.112
The Tiki Island court’s approach to factoring in the economic impact to
an STR host is not unique to Texas law, or even state law for that mat-
ter.113 A Second Circuit case, Dexter 345 Inc. v. Cuomo, provides a useful
comparison to Tiki Island because the claims of property owners were
nearly identical, and both courts addressed the economic impact of bar-
ring STRs under the takings framework.114 Plaintiff building owners in
New York City sought injunctive relief from enforcement of the state’s
new MDL provisions.115 The hosts owned “class A” dwellings under the
New York MDL,116 and were thus prohibited from STR activity but
could rent on a more long-term basis.117 Prior to the MDL’s amendment,
the property owners had a regular practice of renting some of the rooms
on a long-term basis and some as STRs.118 The Second Circuit reached
the opposite result from Tiki Island in finding that the plaintiffs did not
sufficiently plead an irreparable harm because they did not assert easily
calculable figures for lost profits from STR income.119
The investment backed-expectation factor for the Tiki Island plaintiffs
was manifest to the court because of representations made by the village
and due to the surrounding circumstances.120 In other words, the court
found that because the village wrote its ordinance specifically to grandfa-
ther in certain pre-existing condos that were lawfully being used for STRs
before the ordinance made STRs unlawful, plaintiffs had an investment-
backed expectation that they could continue STR activities in reliance on
the village’s ordinance.121 Furthermore, the ordinance permitted the con-
tinued use of the homes “for the purpose for which [they were] con-
structed and used prior to their acquisition, i.e., a single family
residence,” and because the village failed to show that this use was incon-
sistent with STR use, a valid investment backed expectation was pre-
sent.122 Also, that many residents had used their properties for STRs in
the preceding twenty years was relevant and indicative of investment-
backed expectation.123
112. See Taub v. City of Deer Park, 882 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. 1994); Tiki Island, 463
S.W.3d at 579.
113. See, e.g., Dexter 345 Inc. v. Cuomo, 663 F.3d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 2011).
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See supra Part I.C.1.
117. Dexter, 663 F.3d at 62.
118. Id.
119. Compare id. at 63 (finding plaintiffs did not plead sufficient irreparable harm be-
cause they did not assert specific figures), with Vill. of Tiki Island v. Ronquille, 463 S.W.3d
562, 579 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (finding injunction well plead be-
cause host asserted, inter alia, $25,000 of STR income in the prior year).
120. See Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 579.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 579–81.
123. Id. at 580–81.
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C. THE INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATION FACTOR RAISES THE
QUESTION OF APPLYING PRE-EXISTING USE DOCTRINE
Whether there is an investment-backed expectation is perhaps the most
important issue to consider for the purposes of predicting the result of the
Austin dispute and, therefore, STR disputes elsewhere, because it invokes
the question of pre-existing land use.124 Under the law in most United
States jurisdictions, when a new zoning ordinance changes the allowable
land uses in a certain zone, those in possession of land in said zone will be
allowed to continue their operations, which were lawful prior to the ordi-
nance, as a nonconforming use and are exempt from the new ordi-
nance.125 Otherwise, if the city wants to terminate a valid nonconforming
use, it is subject to paying just compensation under the Takings Clause.126
At least one state court has explicitly found that STR use can be con-
strued as a valid nonconforming use when the owner’s use predates the
new ordinance.127 Therefore, as we see in Tiki Island, the municipality
cannot necessarily ban STRs, if they can be said to be a nonconforming
use, without being subject to the Takings Clause.128 Of course, as it was in
Tiki Island, most cities will write grandfathering provisions into their or-
dinances recognizing such nonconforming use as valid.129
The most important takeaway from Tiki Island, at least for Texas liti-
gants, is that the court established that STR use is not necessarily incon-
sistent with single-family residential use, the most restrictive category on
the Euclidean zoning pyramid.130 While this analysis may be legally
flawed for reasons that will be further established in this Comment, it is
not a completely unreasonable proposition considering the circumstances
for the particular community at issue in Tiki Island. As even the village’s
government website admits, Tiki Island is a beach community with “re-
sort-type living” and a prime spot for fishing.131 So for the village to sud-
denly ban a large group of owners, who never lived in these condos full-
time, from using them for what the owners were fully justified in believ-
124. See id.
125. 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 72:1 (4th ed. 2016).
126. See id.
127. Rollison v. City of Key West, 875 So. 2d 659, 662 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
128. Cf. Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 584. The issue of cities recognizing nonconforming
use also raises the question of whether the city must permit such use in contravention of
the zoning ordinance in perpetuity. The simple answer is that where the law recognizes a
valid nonconforming use it limits the property owner from expanding the use and termi-
nates the right to nonconforming use if the property owner abandons the use. ZIEGLER,
supra note 125, § 74:2. The city may also terminate nonconforming use through a process
called amortization, which sets an extended deadline to allow nonconforming landowners
to recoup investments and come into conformity with the ordinance. ZIEGLER, supra note
125, § 74:18.
129. See Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 579 (the court in Tiki Island recognized the village’s
efforts to grandfather in certain properties but the plaintiffs did not have their pre-existing
use considered by the village); see also ZIEGLER, supra note 125, § 72:1.
130. See Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 580–81.
131. VILLAGE OF TIKI-ISLAND, TEX., http://www.villageoftikiisland.org/goverment.htm
[https://perma.cc/7Q26-N4BY] (last visited Jan. 27, 2017).
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ing was what they were meant for, our sense of justice would rightly be
offended.132
Interested parties from both sides in these disputes will likely use Tiki
Island as a guide for both writing and fighting STR ordinances. Because
the presumption of validity for zoning laws under the police power is so
strong,133 STR advocates will certainly face an uphill battle to prove a
regulatory taking. But establishing a claim is now a legal possibility in the
wake of Tiki Island’s holding.134 Where a prospective plaintiff can show
that the STR use of the property predates the passage of restrictive ordi-
nances, the property generated a specific amount of income, and the city
at least passively allowed it, the plaintiff will have an easier course under
the Penn Central standard in establishing that a “distinct investment-
backed expectation” will be frustrated and that a heavy economic impact
will result if an STR permit is denied or rolled back.135 For some of the
plaintiffs in Zaatari, including Mr. Zaatari himself, the takings claim is
probably unripe because Austin continues to recognize these parties’
STR permits.136
City officials writing ordinances, issuing permits, and dealing with STR
hosts informally do have the power to shape their communities through
prospective zoning laws that regulate STR activity, especially in single-
family residential zones.137 But such power must be exercised within the
limits of the Constitution and existing case law interpreting the scope of
zoning authority.138 Cities must recognize that many property owners
may have rights under a nonconforming use theory or a regulatory taking
theory, especially if the city grants hosts STR licenses and later seeks to
further restrict those hosts’ activities.139 But the ability of STR hosts to
assert such a claim depends in large part on how to characterize the activ-
ity, whether accessory versus principal or residential versus commer-
cial.140 The following Part will discuss these legal fault lines in more
detail.
132. See Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 579–80.
133. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
134. See Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 585.
135. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 585.
136. See Orig. Pet., supra note 55, at 3.
137. See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
138. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 933 (Tex. 1998).
139. See Rollison v. City of Key West, 875 So. 2d 659, 662 (Fla. App. 2004) (property
owner’s STR use of condo was a lawful nonconforming use predating city’s passage of
more restrictive ordinance); cf. Mo. Rock, Inc. v. Winholtz, 614 S.W.2d 734, 739 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981) (ruling that city could not infringe on strip mining activity that was a valid
nonconforming use before enactment of a zoning ordinance by requiring property owner
to seek a permit).
140. See Zale, supra note 17, at 523, 550.
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III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONS OF ZONING
ORDINANCES MAY PRESENT A CHINK IN THE
ARMOR OF THE POLICE POWER
PRESUMPTION
Municipalities writing zoning ordinances enjoy a rather strong pre-
sumption of validity under the police power.141 However, as this Part will
show, courts may find ordinances too restrictive or too vague.142 A court
might find that a city is not interpreting its own ordinance correctly as
written,143 and thus the uses a city seeks to prohibit are construed as per-
fectly legal under the applicable ordinance. This Part first explains the
special protection the Supreme Court has recognized for single-family
residential districts and then turns to how poorly drafted ordinances can
provide an opening for STR plaintiffs to protect their property interests.
Lastly, this Part will analyze the commercial/residential use distinction in
zoning laws and how it has been applied to regulation of STRs by sug-
gesting how these approaches can be improved. This Part argues that the
municipal practice of simply casting STRs as commercial, and then ban-
ning their use, fails to recognize that much of the host activity has little
impact on neighboring property, and ordinances should be more carefully
drafted to account for the vast differences in STR host behavior.
A. OCCUPANCY CAPS WITHIN STR ORDINANCES ARE
SUBSTANTIALLY RELATED TO THE GENERAL HEALTH,
SAFETY, AND WELFARE AS A MATTER OF
POLICE POWER VALIDITY
Any discussion of STR freedoms must consider the special power the
Supreme Court has recognized of cities to protect residents in single-fam-
ily districts from the impacts of incompatible use under the police
power.144 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas addressed whether the city’s
definition of a single family as no more than two people “[un]related by
blood, adoption, or marriage” living together under the same roof could
be sustained in the face of several constitutional arguments, including a
violation of the freedom to associate.145 The Court found that in enacting
the ordinance, the village sought to address the growing problems of ur-
banization and boarding houses creeping into quiet residential neighbor-
141. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
142. Viviano v. Sandusky, 991 N.E.2d 1263, 1267–68 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
143. City of New York v. 330 Continental LLC, 60 A.D.3d 226, 227 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009).
144. See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974). Whether the substan-
tial relation test is more appropriately plead under the Due Process Clause or the Takings
Clause is not necessarily an issue in Texas courts, but a charge that an ordinance is not
substantially related to the general welfare, etc., should be brought as a Due Process claim
in federal courts for the reasons stated by Justice O’Connor in Lingle, and a similar plead-
ing strategy would perhaps be wise in Texas courts as well. See Hackbelt 27 Partners, L.P.
v. City of Coppell, 661 F. App’x 843, 849 (5th Cir. 2016).
145. 416 U.S. at 2–3, 7.
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hoods.146 It reasoned that legislative bodies should be given broad
powers to improve the public welfare, which encompasses such ideals as
aesthetics, spaciousness, and cleanliness; and prevents scourges such as
disease, overcrowding, and “misery.”147
The Supreme Court, however, also placed limits on the city’s power to
define the occupant’s characteristics for single-family dwellings in Moore
v. City of East Cleveland.148 Under East Cleveland’s zoning ordinance,
single-family use was restricted to only certain categories within a nuclear
family, thus criminal sanctions were brought for a grandmother and
grandson living under the same roof.149 For the Court, such an intrusion
into private and family life could hardly be sustained as a rational exer-
cise of the police power, and the ordinance was struck.150
Many jurisdictions set a limit on how many unrelated people may oc-
cupy a single-family residence at one time through their zoning ordi-
nances.151 Courts are often faced with the task of interpreting zoning
statutes that define allowable uses, and the language contained in these
ordinances can range in clarity from unconstitutionally vague to highly
technical.152 One case of the technical variety, Hall v. Zoning Board of
Appeals, interpreted Edgartown, Massachusetts’s zoning by-laws.153 The
court found that if the number of occupants exceeded the allowable num-
ber for a residential dwelling, and the ordinance defined “transient resi-
dential facilit[ies]” as “lodging houses with a capacity of more than four
guest beds,” then the residential use was transformed into an impermissi-
ble “transient residential facility.”154 Under Edgartown’s zoning by-laws,
people in residential districts could have up to four boarders, but plain-
tiffs in Hall were found to have exceeded these allowable limits when the
evidence showed that the subject dwellings housed between seven to ten
occupants, although only four names appeared on the lease.155 The court
found that exceeding the occupancy limits set out by the zoning by-law
was a use that would ordinarily be inconsistent with single-family residen-
tial use.156
But where a zoning statute fails to define its terms in seeking to limit
STR activity with clear language, the city can be frustrated in its planning
efforts by conscientious litigants intent on profiting from their prop-
erty.157 Whatever Sandusky, Ohio was attempting to proscribe, the ap-
146. Id. at 9.
147. Id. at 5–6 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 31, 32–33 (1954)).
148. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
149. Id. at 498–99.
150. Id. at 499.
151. 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 149.
152. See Viviano v. Sandusky, 991 N.E.2d 1263, 1268 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013); Hall v.
Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 549 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
153. 549 N.E.2d at 435.
154. Id. at 435–37.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 437.
157. See Viviano, 991 N.E.2d at 1268.
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peals court found that it did not use clear enough language when it wrote
its transient rental ordinance.158 The ordinance defined a “Dwelling” to
be a “building designed or occupied exclusively for non-transient residen-
tial use (including one-family, two-family, or multifamily buildings).”159
Because the statute failed to define “non-transient residential use” by us-
ing a certain time frame, whether days or weeks, the court found the ordi-
nance void for vagueness under Ohio state standards.160
Drafting errors, or having a court construe statutory language in a
manner that the legislative body did not necessarily intend, are not con-
fined to local ordinances, as one case in New York shows.161 Prior to New
York amending its MDL to more strictly proscribe STRs in Class A
dwellings, the MDL defined the Class A multiple dwelling as “a multiple
dwelling which is occupied, as a rule, for permanent residence pur-
poses.”162 Furthermore, under the city’s Zoning Regulation (ZR), the
owners’ buildings were designated as “apartment hotels” in which the pri-
mary use of the building was to be for permanent residency.163 Local ho-
tel businesses that had occupied certain apartment buildings since the
1940s, and carried on vacation rentals alongside their long-term leases,
prevailed against an injunction brought by the city because of this statu-
tory ambiguity.164 The court found that use of the language “as a rule”
and “primary purpose” meant that a minority of the building’s units could
be used as STRs under these statutes and that the city failed to show that
a majority of the units were being used for transient purposes in violation
of a clear statutory rule.165 New York would of course amend its MDL in
2010 to more clearly state that no STRs in Class A dwellings would be
permitted.166
As the cases in this Subsection illustrate, local governments have broad
ranging powers to regulate the activity of property within single-family
residential districts. But as the cases from Parts II.B. and C have also
shown, cities might bind themselves to observing pre-existing property
rights that frustrate planning because of the representations they make to
the public, the permits they issue, and the uses they allow.167 Thus, key
aspects to effective planning include clear drafting of ordinances, obser-
vation of vested property rights by the use of grandfathering provisions,
constitutionally permissible definitions of “family,” and the use of specific
occupancy caps when cities want to expand residential uses. As we saw in
158. See id.
159. Id. at 1265.
160. Id. at 1268.
161. City of New York v. 330 Continental LLC, 60 A.D.3d 226, 227 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009).
162. Id. at 228 (quoting N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 4 (McKinney) (amended 2011) (em-
phasis added).
163. Id. at 229 (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 228, 230.
165. Id. at 230 (“There is no requirement under either the ZR or the certificates of
occupancy that the subject buildings be used exclusively for permanent occupancy.”).
166. See supra Part I.C.1.
167. See supra Part II.B–C.
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Belle Terre, the city may go so far as to restrict a single-family dwelling
use to only members of the same family unit with no more than two unre-
lated persons.168 Given this permissible restriction, the six-unrelated-per-
son rule set out by the Austin ordinance is generous by comparison.169
Thus, the right to conduct STRs within those districts will be valid under
either a nonconforming use theory (the city’s scheme permitted commer-
cial use, or did not regulate use, before passing an ordinance permitting
only residential use) or because the city issued the property owner a per-
mit to conduct STRs, which cannot be subsequently withdrawn
arbitrarily.170
B. STRS CAN BE CONSIDERED ACCESSORY, RESIDENTIAL, OR
COMMERCIAL USE AND AMBIGUITIES ARE RESOLVED
ON INCONSISTENT BASES
No unifying legal theory on how to classify STR use has emerged in the
wake of the sharing economy revolution.171 Some courts have maintained
outright bans on rentals,172 whereas other courts have held, or at least
suggested in dicta, that there is nothing inconsistent about STRs and sin-
gle-family residential use.173 Courts and cities alike have asserted a range
of legal interpretations that include accessory, residential, and commer-
cial use.174
In other words, STR use is whatever the city says it is. Even when a
court has found that STR use could be construed as consistent with sin-
gle-family use, this was only because the city failed to clearly specify oth-
erwise in its zoning ordinance.175 For example, in Marchenko v. Zoning
Hearing Board, a host in Monroe County, Pennsylvania utilized her per-
sonal residence under a home-sharing model and was present or easily
reachable for the duration of the guest’s stay.176 The ordinance at issue
defined a “single-family dwelling” as one “occupied exclusively by one
family,” and Pennsylvania had case law stating that as long as any use for
168. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
169. See id.; cf. AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-795(G) (2016).
170. See Vill. of Tiki Island v. Ronquille, 463 S.W.3d 562, 579 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2015, no pet.); ZIEGLER, supra note 125, § 72:1; cf. Mo. Rock, Inc. v. Winholtz, 614
S.W.2d 734, 739 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
171. See Zale, supra note 17, at 523.
172. See, e.g., Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 830 (Ind. 2011).
173. See Marchenko v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 147 A.3d 947, 950–51 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2016); Tiki Island, 463 S.W.3d at 580–81.
174. See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-3(B)(10) (2016) (STR use is a
residential classification); SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 9.51.030 (2015) (va-
cation rentals classified under lodging, a commercial use); Siwinski, 949 N.E.2d at 830
(renting home in designated district for profit was a commercial use); Marchenko, 147 A.3d
at 950–51 (STRs are a permitted residential use); Denver Short-Term Rentals FAQ,
DENVERGOV.ORG, https://www.denvergov.org/content/dam/denvergov/Portals/723/docu-
ments/STR%20FAQ_2-29-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/78BH-HQ64] (Denver considers STRs
as an accessory use permissible in any residential district, although this language does not
appear in the city’s ordinances.).
175. See Marchenko, 147 A.3d at 950–51.
176. Id. at 950.
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transient purposes was not “purely transient,” STR use could be permit-
ted under the meaning of single-family use.177 Hence, Marchenko’s use of
her home under the home-sharing model did not exceed the scope of how
Pennsylvania would construe the meaning of single-family use unless the
city set out additional qualification of the use in the ordinance.178
The Pennsylvania approach is similar to how a court will normally view
STR activity as an accessory use—one incidental and secondary to the
principal use179—or more traditionally, “boarding.”180 The general rule
for boarding as an accessory use is that the use must be proportional to
that exercised by the principal resident—when the boarding use exceeds
that limit, the use becomes commercial.181
On the contrary, the Indiana Supreme Court found language similar to
that at issue in Marchenko enough to construe a host’s rental activity as
commercial and not consistent with single-family residential use.182 The
ordinance at issue in Siwinksi v. Town of Ogden Dunes defined commer-
cial use as “any activity conducted for profit or gain” and single-family
dwellings as “occupied exclusively as a residence by one family.”183 De-
fendant homeowner argued that because at any given time only one fam-
ily occupied the residence, the defendant did not violate the ordinance.184
The court rejected this argument because it found the hosts were engaged
in a commercial use since the residence was not occupied “exclusively” by
a single family, but instead occupied sometimes by the owners and at
other times by the renters.185 Furthermore, the owners conceded that
they derived a profit from this use, and it was therefore commercial for
that reason as well.186 How can almost identical language result in such
drastically different results?
The differences between Marchenko and Siwinski can be explained by
the different canons of construction used by the Pennsylvania and Indi-
ana Supreme Courts.187 Whereas the Indiana Supreme Court was guided
177. Id. at 950–51 (quoting Albert v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 854 A.2d 401, 410 (Pa.
2004)).
178. Id. at 951; see Albert, 854 A.2d at 409–10.
179. Zale, supra note 17, at 550.
180. ZIEGLER, supra note 125, § 33:35.
181. Id.
182. Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes, 949 N.E.2d 825, 830 (Ind. 2011).
183. OGDEN DUNES, IND., TOWN CODE § 152.002 (2011).
184. Siwinski, 949 N.E.2d at 829.
185. Id. at 830
186. Id.; cf. Brookford, LLC v. Penraat, 8 N.Y.S.3d 859, 863 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014) (refer-
ring to a tenant’s STR activity in violation of the MDL as commercial activity and an
“illegal hotel,” a common rallying cry for those taking a hard stance against STR use in
their communities).
187. Compare Siwinksi, 949 N.E.2d at 829 (quoting State v. Carmel Healthcare Mgmt.,
Inc., 660 N.E.2d 1379, 1386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)) (“We should also remember a cardinal
rule of statutory construction, which is to ‘ascertain the intent of the drafter.’”), with Al-
bert v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 854 A.2d 401, 405 (Pa. 2004) (“zoning ordinances are to be
liberally construed and interpreted broadly to permit a landowner the broadest possible
use of her land”).
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by legislative intent in deciding how to read the zoning ordinance,188 the
Pennsylvania courts broadly construe zoning terms to maximize property
owners’ freedom within the meaning of the ordinance.189 Thus, whether
STRs will be permissible within a residential district comes down to not
only the language the city writes into the ordinance, but also which canon
of construction the court will apply to the language. Will the court con-
sider the intent of the drafter or give the ordinance a broad
construction?190
In Texas, courts will be more likely to take an approach like that in
Pennsylvania and construe restrictions on property owners narrowly
while construing permissive language broadly because zoning regulations
“are in derogation of common-law rights to use property.”191 In deciding
how to litigate STR claims against a city, it is imperative for advocates to
understand their state’s approach to statutory construction of zoning or-
dinances. Because Texas’s strict construction of zoning laws tends to max-
imize the freedom of property owners, STR advocates in Austin have one
more legal arrow they can place in their quiver.192 However, because
Austin has drafted a more precise set of requirements to regulate its STR
permit holders,193 only those with valid nonconforming uses or who were
previously issued permits are likely to have viable claims against the
city.194
The residential versus commercial distinction, while providing courts
with an easy mechanism for declaring STR use to be lawful or illegal,
does not adequately balance the prerogatives of the city with the recogni-
tion of individual property rights. As this Comment asserts in Part I,
supra, the way forward is for cities to take a more functional approach in
drafting ordinances to account for the variable impact that different kinds
of STR use have on a neighborhood. This can be done by allowing for
free use of home sharing while restricting the number of transient renters,
who are generally unaccountable for their guests.195 Curbing transient
rentals will remain a due process issue because property owners will still
seek to challenge such restrictions. In the next Part, this Comment will
address many of the policy arguments that have been asserted as justifica-
tion for regulating STRs and analyzes their merits against the backdrop
188. See Siwinksi, 949 N.E.2d at 829.
189. See Albert, 854 A.2d at 405.
190. Another distinction between the Indiana and Pennsylvania cases is that in
Marchenko the host was home sharing whereas the hosts in Siwinski were using the home
as a transient rental—or were, at a minimum, home renting. See Siwinski, 949 N.E.2d at
829; Marchenko v. Zoning Hearing Board, 147 A.3d 947, 950–51 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2016).
Austin has recognized these distinctions by providing different levels of permits depending
on the level of STR activity. See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-788 et. seq.
(2015).
191. See, e.g., City of Kermit v. Spruill, 328 S.W.2d 219, 223 (Tex. Civ. App.—El Paso
1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
192. See id.
193. See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-788 to -799 (2015).
194. See supra Part II.B.
195. See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-788 to -799.
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of the enforcement challenges nearly all cities have faced with the emer-
gence of the sharing economy.
IV. CITIES HAVE ASSERTED A RANGE OF POLICY
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR BRINGING STRs INTO
THE REGULATORY FOLD
Zoning ordinances are presumed valid as long as they are substantially
related to the “public health, safety, morals, or general welfare” of the
communities they regulate.196 In the context of STR regulations, cities
have asserted several justifications in either prohibiting STR use or im-
plementing a permitting scheme.197 Cities claim that tougher regulations
are necessary to deal with nuisances, such as loud parties, associated with
some STR guests198—this has also been referred to as the nebulous
“neighborhood character” justification.199 Other policy arguments in-
clude the preservation of affordable housing,200 safety of residences and
guests alike,201 and the generation of transient occupancy tax revenue.202
The policy arguments with the strongest legal force, interestingly, appear
to be preservation of neighborhood character and tax generation whereas
the other policy arguments have had less legal or empirical force.
A. PRESERVATION OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTER HAS BEEN
FOUND TO BE A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER
As Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea correctly observed, there is
strong Supreme Court precedent favoring the municipality’s capacity to
preserve neighborhood character.203 This ideal encompasses things such
as aesthetics and prevention of nuisances so that “family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a
sanctuary for people.”204 The Ewing court found that the city could val-
idly restrict the occupation of homes in a residential area to those staying
longer than thirty days, even if such people were not causing nuisances,
because only permanent residents have a stake in the community and
stick around long enough to get involved in things like “volunteer[ing] at
the library” or “lead[ing] a Scout troop.”205 The court also recognized
that the city was not trying to simply ban outsiders or visitors from com-
196. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
197. See FTC Report, supra note 1, at *63–64.
198. See id. at 63.
199. Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 386 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(“non-residential uses may have an increasingly deleterious impact on a residential district
‘until, finally, the residential character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of
detached residences are utterly destroyed’”) (quoting Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394).
200. Samaan, supra note 8, at 16–19.
201. Brookford, LLC v. Penraat, 8 N.Y.S.3d 859, 862–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
202. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 29,
at 9.
203. See Ewing, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 386 (citing Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394).
204. Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
205. Ewing, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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ing to their city, it was only seeking to confine such activity to commercial
areas.206 Although such standards as “neighborhood character” can often
be hard to define—and should therefore present concerns for any legal
scholar—judges (even Supreme Court Justices) and city officials often
find these appeals persuasive.
The Austin City Council was probably influenced most by a desire to
preserve neighborhood character in passing its STR ordinance when it
listened to its citizens at the public hearings.207 Even still, under Texas
law, “[t]he existence of a nuisance is not a necessary prerequisite to the
enactment of zoning regulations.”208 Therefore, cities need not wait for
the nuisance to present itself before enacting zoning ordinances to place
reasonable limits on transient renting.
B. DISRUPTION OF TRADITIONAL INDUSTRIES WILL SPAWN
NEW FORMS OF TAXATION
STR activity, especially with the ease of transaction brought about by
Airbnb and other platforms, has made a tremendous impact on our econ-
omy.209 The platforms have clearly benefited the everyday consumer,
who may now be able to afford lodging in an expensive city where before
a hotel room was prohibitively expensive.210 But platforms have also dis-
rupted the traditional hotel industry.211 Cities notice this effect most in
the accompanying loss of tax revenue,212 and traditional hotels often
complain of the unfair effect of having to compete with an industry peer
that is not subject to regulation such as the transient occupancy tax.213
The ability of the city to collect this missing tax revenue, however, de-
pends on the ability to enforce permitting schemes by locating and inves-
tigating defiant (or ignorant) hosts. Airbnb claims to be supportive of
requiring its hosts to pay their fair share of taxes and asserts its amenabil-
ity to working with cities in this endeavor,214 but this may only be true to
a certain degree.215 Airbnb was embroiled in a high-profile dispute with
New York’s Attorney General over a subpoena requesting host informa-
tion so that authorities could enforce the ban on STRs in class A dwell-
ings.216 But Airbnb prevailed in the trial court below and was not
required to disclose host information that authorities were unable to
glean from the bare online listings.217 Although the city could not sub-
206. Id. at 388–89.
207. See City of Austin, September 15, 2015 City Council Meetings, supra note 61.
208. 77 TEX. JUR. 3D ZONING §2 (citing Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 73 S.W.2d 475
(1934)).
209. FTC Report, supra note 1, at *2.
210. See FTC Report, supra note 1, at *1.
211. FTC Report, supra note 1, at *53; see also Zervas et al., supra note 54.
212.  HIRSHON ET AL, supra note 26, at 11–12.
213. FTC Report, supra note 1, at *10.
214. Palombo, supra note 49, at 297.
215. See Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786, 788–89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
216. Id. at 793.
217. Id.
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poena Airbnb for host information in New York City, the federal court in
the Northern District of California held that San Francisco could fine
Airbnb for collecting a fee from hosts who were found to be in violation
of the city’s permitting requirement.218
Despite the success in the San Francisco case, the practical reality is
that cities attempting to enforce permitting schemes, host presence re-
quirements, or general prohibitions face an impossible task in eradicating
all illegal forms of STR use.219 Even if the city wanted to ban STRs alto-
gether, the use would probably continue in large numbers despite en-
forcement efforts. The city therefore has a much stronger incentive to
utilize a permit scheme to (a) control the prevalence of STR use in partic-
ular zones, and (b) collect tax revenue it would otherwise lose if there
were an outright prohibition.
C. GUEST SAFETY IS A TENUOUS POLICY JUSTIFICATION
As this Comment explained in Part I, New York City authorities face
unique challenges in seeking to create the safest and healthiest environ-
ment in a city of millions of people living literally on top of each other. In
Brookford, LLC v. Penraat, the court explained as much and elaborated
that, unlike as required in the city’s hotels and other regulated lodging
facilities, Class A dwellings used for STRs do not meet the same high
level of code specifications for ensuring fire safety.220 Unlike all of the
other cases discussed in this Comment, Penraat concerned a landlord-ten-
ant dispute where the landlord sought to enjoin his tenant from engaging
in STRs in violation of the MDL.221 The court found that the defendant’s
activities were a threat to the safety of not only the guests but also the
permanent residents of the building who “must endure the inconvenience
of hotel occupancy in their buildings.”222
The concern of fire code safety was also integral to the New York At-
torney General’s report, which included an affidavit and statistics of fire
department and code officials in support of the findings.223 While these
findings showed that fire safety code requirements were a necessary re-
sponse to deadly incidents in New York’s past, and likely saved hundreds
218. Airbnb, Inc. v. City of San Francisco, No. 3:16–cv–03615–JD, 2016 WL 6599821, at
*7–8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2016).
219. See id. at *2 (San Francisco estimates only 20% of Airbnb rentals are validly regis-
tered); HIRSHON et al., supra note 26, at 22.
220. 8 N.Y.S.3d 859, 862–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014).
221. Id. at 859. It should be noted that some cities, to include Indianapolis and Wash-
ington, D.C., have taken the position that STR issues do not necessarily need to be re-
solved by city regulation and that “issues may get solved by private interactions between
renters and their landlords.” HIRSHON ET AL., supra note 26, at 22–23. Other legal doc-
trines that could provide a solution outside of municipal intervention are the laws gov-
erning common-interest communities and common-law nuisance. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 6 (AM. LAW INST. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 821D (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
222. Penraat, 8 N.Y.S.3d at 863.
223. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 29,
at 21–30.
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of lives over the past decades, the report did not include any incidents of
STR guests being harmed as a result of their presence in a Class A dwell-
ing.224 The safety justification is not as persuasive as other reasons as-
serted in favor of STR intervention. It seems unlikely that an STR guest,
using an apartment in nearly the same manner as the permanent occu-
pant would, is at any greater risk of dying in a fire than any of the other
residents or children living in the building. This is not to say, however,
that if an owner deliberately modifies the dwelling so as to violate ex-
isting codes and to maximize the usable space for STRs, a significant fire
risk would not be created.
D. LITTLE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT RISE OF STRS HAS
IMPACTED THE SUPPLY OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Proponents of stricter regulations for STR activity have asserted the
affordable housing argument in Austin,225 New York,226 and the Los An-
geles area.227 The argument goes like this: if people owning several pieces
of valuable real-estate are allowed to use those properties for the more
profitable enterprise of transient renting, then the long-term residents of
the city are harmed because there are then fewer units available and the
corresponding effect is a rise in the price of rent.228 Another possible
effect is that people living in the more upscale residential neighborhoods
see a drop in their property values because a neighbor uses the property
for STRs, resulting in a higher transient presence in the neighborhood.
On the other hand, STR advocates such as Airbnb and others deny that
STR use has any effect on affordable housing, and they assert that the
real effect is actually to the contrary—under a home-sharing model, a
person could earn extra income to enable the person to meet increasing
costs of living.229 But the consensus appears to be that any number of
factors might affect the availability of affordable housing in a city, as even
the National League of Cities conceded, and, therefore, more research is
needed to determine what, if any, impact there is.230
CONCLUSION
Internet-based short-term rentals have changed many lives for the bet-
ter: certainly the platforms themselves have been enriched, hosts can now
derive income where before they may not have been able to, and guests
224. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, supra note 29,
at 21–30.
225. Claire Ricke, Lawsuit: Austin’s Short Term Rental Ordinance Is ‘Illegal’ (June 20,
2016), http://kxan.com/2016/06/20/lawsuit-trying-to-block-austins-short-term-rentals [https:/
/perma.cc/U9L5-4VDN].
226. Benner, supra note 31.
227. Samaan, supra note 8, at 16–19.
228. See FTC Report, supra note 1, at *64; see also Zale, supra note 17, at 532–33 (the
sharing economy benefits those with the most desirable assets more than the “regular
folk”).
229. See FTC Report, supra note 1, at 64.
230. HIRSHON ET AL., supra note 26, at 18–19.
2017] Re-zoning the Sharing Economy 591
as consumers now have alternatives for accommodation when they travel
at lower price points. But the new economic order did not emerge with-
out resistance from those who may have been affected negatively. The
person whose next-door neighbor abuses his STR permit by renting to
thirty guests in a single-family home, the budget motel owner who saw his
market share challenged, or the landlord whose tenant violates the lease
are each potential victims.
Professor Zale tells us that the commercial/noncommercial distinction
applies in a wide array of legal contexts concerning the sharing economy
but that a clear point at which to draw the line has eluded us.231 As we
saw with the case studies in Part I, cities will continue to struggle to find
the sweet spot of protecting the property rights of citizens while protect-
ing the quality of life of their neighbors, with some jurisdictions skewing
more to one side than the other.232 Cities attempting to take bold stances
against STR use may get themselves into trouble with regulatory taking
claims and, therefore, they should be mindful of pre-existing property
rights.233 Although municipalities have a high level of deference in zoning
decisions, a litigator might prevail over new STR regulations by attacking
their drafting errors.234
This Comment has argued that while the authority to enact zoning laws
to restrict STRs is extensive, it should be exercised in a way that ad-
dresses the complexity of the phenomenon. As shown, a failure to do so
results in either constitutional challenges or void ordinances, which send
underpaid and overworked city attorneys back to the drawing board. The
City of Austin has taken some of the right steps even if, in other regards,
the ordinance may be unconstitutional. Austin’s STR ordinance is useful
in that it recognizes the gradients of use that are comparable to the three
models this Comment proposes: it more heavily restricts Type II uses—
transient rentals—than Type I home-sharing rentals.235 This is the best
way to ensure that those with the most accountability are given the most
leeway in conducting STRs with minimal impact, whereas those who are
largely detached from the community can only profit by renting an in-
come property to a long-term resident. Only by more thoroughly ac-
counting for the new ways in which property owners are using their
homes will cities be able to find their way forward in solving the STR
controversy.
231. Zale, supra note 17, at 523.
232. Supra Part I.
233. Supra Part II.
234. Supra Part III.
235. See AUSTIN, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 25-2-788 to -799.
